

# The Spy Who Threat Modeled



# About Me

Currently: Security Engineer at PACCAR

Formerly: Security engineer across several industries


Education: Cyberspace Operations, AFIT;  
MBA, Washington State

Focus Areas: Vulnerability management,  
awareness and training, program  
development

\*Disclaimer: Opinions my own




# Vehicles Are Complicated



# A Brief History

- 1885: Invented the car
- 1908: Ford Model-T
- 1975-1979: Engine Management Systems
- 2011: ISO 26262, Functional Safety of Road Vehicles
- 2015: Jeep Hack
- 2020: ISO 21434, Cybersecurity Engineering of Road Vehicles
- 2021: UNECE 155, Cybersecurity and Cyber Security Management Systems



# Practical Damage Scenarios


- Basic functionality: Go, stop, steer.
- Functional safety: Don't crash. Have appropriate lights. Fail safe.
- Threat intelligence: Theft. Remote takeover. Abuse of driver privacy.




Damage Scenario: *Users*

# An Easy 8 Step Process


1. Item Definition
2. Identify Damage Scenarios
3. Identify Threat Scenarios
4. Identify Impact Ratings
5. Attack Path Analysis
6. Attack Path Feasibility Ratings
7. Risk Analysis
8. Risk Treatment



# 1. Item Definition




# 1. Item Definition





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## 2: Identify Damage Scenarios

Getting Captured!

Resources stolen or destroyed!

Losing the Villain's trail!

Giving information away!




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


### 3: Identify Threat Scenarios



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## 4: Identify Impact Ratings

**Safety**

Severe; Bond could face serious or fatal injuries!

**Operation**

Severe; Engines don't like bullet holes

**Privacy**

Moderate; Bond's only PII is location & plate

**Financial**


Moderate; Bond has significant means

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
## 5: Attack Path Analysis





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## 6: Attack Feasibility Analysis

|                       | Time             | Expertise     | Knowledge     | Window of Opportunity | TOTAL RATING |
|-----------------------|------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------------|--------------|
| Take A Shortcut       | Under 1 Day: 0   | Proficient: 3 | Restricted: 3 | Moderate: 4           | 10: HIGH     |
| Drive Faster          | Under 1 Day: 0   | Expert: 6     | Public: 0     | Unlimited: 0          | 6: CRITICAL  |
| Set A Trap            | Under 1 Month: 4 | Proficient: 3 | Restricted: 3 | Easy: 1               | 11: HIGH     |
| Run Bond Off The Road | Under 1 Day: 0   | Expert: 6     | Public: 0     | Difficult: 10         | 16: MEDIUM   |

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


## 7: Risk Analysis

|          | Low | Medium                      | High              | Critical                |
|----------|-----|-----------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Critical |     |                             |                   | <b>Drive<br/>Faster</b> |
| High     |     | <b>Take A<br/>Shortcut</b>  | <b>Set A Trap</b> |                         |
| Medium   |     |                             |                   |                         |
| Low      |     | <b>Run Off The<br/>Road</b> |                   |                         |

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## 8: Risk Treatments


|        |                                       |  |
|--------|---------------------------------------|--|
| HIGH   | <b>Henchmen take a shortcut</b>       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Radar scanner behind mirror</li><li>• Radar screen in dash</li></ul> |
|        | <b>Henchmen drive faster</b>          | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Smoke screen from exhaust</li><li>• Oil jet and caltrops</li></ul>   |
| HIGH   | <b>Henchmen set a trap</b>            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Radar scanner behind mirror</li><li>• Radar screen in dash</li></ul> |
| MEDIUM | <b>Henchmen run Bond off the road</b> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Tire slasher</li></ul>   |

# TARAs All The Way Down

Q: What needs a TARA?

A: Any component that can impact the security risk!

Practically: ECUs are interconnected;  
be methodical and consistent in  
approach



# Tooling

- Pros
  - Automation
  - Consistency
  - Repeatability
- Cons
  - Steep learning curve
  - Customization required
  - Needs extensive working knowledge

**SPREADSHEETS  
& FLOWCHARTS**

**MICROSOFT  
THREAT MODELING**

**VEHICLE  
THREAT MODELING**





# “Easy” Wins

- Disable unused interfaces
- Seperate devices of different trust levels
- Use cryptography properly
- Lock down supporting systems
- Use diagnostics and monitoring wisely



# Conclusion

- Don't try to threat model everything at once, break it down
- Don't *overthink* it
- Get help from different disciplines
- Threat modeling is a continuous process
- Perfect is the enemy of good enough

